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INTRODUCTION TO CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT
Leigh B. Bienen, Kristi Kirschner, and Peter David Blanckt
This 1997 conference, titled Socially-Assisted Dying: Media, Money
& Meaning, brought together rehabilitation and medical specialists, rep-
resentatives of the disability community, lawyers, ethicists, and others to
discuss Vacco v. Quill' and Washington v. Glucksberg,2 the two physi-
cian-assisted suicide cases that, at the time, were pending before the
United States Supreme Court. The conference provided a forum for dis-
cussing the social, medical, and legal implications of socially-assisted
dying, with particular emphasis on the disability context.
Euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, withholding or withdrawing
life-sustaining treatment, and palliative care are types of assistance in
end-of-life decision-maldng that may be arranged on a theoretical contin-
uum of "socially-assisted dying." This continuum reflects the extent to
which society and its members play a life-ending role for terminally ill
persons, persons with severe disabilities, the elderly, and others. The
endpoints of the continuum reflect different views and values about life
and death.
Active euthanasia, or the administration of lethal treatments, lies at
one end of the continuum. Total and pure palliative care lies at the other
end of the continuum.3 Yet, as a treatment regime, palliation has a dual
nature in that treating symptoms such as pain may sometimes uninten-
tionally hasten death.4 Physician-assisted suicide, situated somewhere in
the middle of the continuum, authorizes physicians to write prescriptions
for lethal doses of medication that patients can then voluntarily ingest.
Related practices by physicians and others of withdrawing and withhold-
" Leigh B. Bienen, a Senior Lecturer at Northwestern University School of Law, is a
criminal defense attorney whose areas of expertise include capital punishment, sex crimes and
rape reform legislation. Dr. Kristi Kirschner is the Director of the Health Resource Center for
Women with Disabilities at the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago and an Assistant Professor
in the Department of Rehabilitation at the Northwestern University Medical School where she
holds the Coleman Chair in Rehabilitation Medicine. Peter David Blanck is Professor of law,
of Preventive Medicine, and of Psychology at the University of Iowa and the Director of the
Iowa Law, Health Policy, and Disability Center.
1 The Supreme Court released its opinion after the conference. See Vacco v. Quill, 117
S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
2 The Supreme Court released its opinion after the conference. See Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
3 Palliation involves the use of medications to treat symptoms.
4 See John Glasson, Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the Ameri-
can Medical Association, 10 IssuEs L. & MED. 91, 92 (1994).
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ing life-sustaining treatment are also in this middle range of the
continuum.
Persons with disabilities who are ill and facing end-of-life situations
must contend with myths and misconceptions about the relative value of
their lives.5 The National Council on Disability has noted that, despite
diverse views among individual members, the disability community col-
lectively recognizes "the danger of discrimination to the interests and fair
treatment of people with disabilities."' 6 Debate continues within the disa-
bility community and among physicians who care for the disabled.7
The amici briefs filed in Quill and Glucksberg reflected a range of
views expressed by many respected advocates from the disability com-
munity. At this conference, scholars with disabilities who were opposed
to physician-assisted suicide legalization contended that societal judg-
ments made about quality of life would encourage society to devalue
their lives, which are defined in part by the experience and culture of
disability. They further argued that limiting access to physician-assisted
suicide to people with terminal or chronic illness is inherently discrimi-
natory.8 The result leads to unwarranted decisions to end the lives of
persons who may be disabled.
Other respected members of the disability community present at the
conference pointed to the right of self-determination as a basis for argu-
ing for legalization. This view is grounded in the belief that people with
disabilities have been denied the right to make their own choices, and
that too often, others have imposed undesired life choices upon them.9
The participants in the conference disagreed vigorously on many
things, but all concurred that there was little or no data on the number or
character of the population that might be affected by a change in the laws
governing physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia. The following num-
bers suggest that courts will not be able to make case-by-case determina-
tions or indulge in long philosophical discussions over autonomy to
decide individual cases.
5 See Paul Steven Miller, The Impact of Assisted Suicide on Persons with Disabilities-
Is it a Right Without Freedom?, 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 47, 48-54 (1993).
6 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, AssisTED SUICIDE: A DisABmrrY PERSPECTIVE
(1997).
7 See, e.g., Stephen L. Mikochik, Assisted Suicide and Disabled People, 46 DEPAUL L.
REv. 987 (1997); David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 335 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 663 (1996). At this Conference the debate extended to whether or not physician-
assisted suicide did or did not have special ramifications for the disabled community. See
Conference Transcript, Socially-Assisted Dying: Media, Money & Meaning, 7 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 1998) (Session I, remarks of Dr. Gill and Mr. Batavia).
8 See Conference Transcript, supra note 7 (Session IV, comments of Diane Coleman
and audience participants).
9 See id. (comments of Dr. Gill and Dr. Bowman).
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In 1995, there were an estimated 1.4 million elderly residents aged
65 and older living in nursing homes. 10 These nursing home residents
were predominantly women (75 percent), white, non-Hispanic, and wid-
owed." About 17 percent were classified as having "mental disor-
ders."'12 More than 60 percent were on Medicare or Medicaid. 13 These
figures do not include patients hospitalized or institutionalized who are
not over 65, or those who are chronically or severely ill, or incapacitated
outside of the institutional setting.
Several important legal developments have taken place since April
1997, when the conference took place. First, the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act, which permits physician-assisted suicide under certain de-
fined conditions, survived a serious challenge. 14 It is unlikely that any
further legal challenge to its application will be forthcoming. 15 The
United States Congress, however, passed a law prohibiting the use of
10 See Achintya N. Dey, Characteristics of Elderly Nursing Home Residents: Data From
the 1995 National Nursing Home Survey, 289 ADVANCE DATA 1, ,2 (Center for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention/National Center for Health Statistics 1997).
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 See id. at 4.
14 See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800-.897 (1996 Supp.). Oregon's Death with Dignity Act
became law through the legislative initiative process in November, 1994. It passed by 51
percent to 49 percent in 1994, and Oregon became the first state to legalize doctor-assisted
suicide. On November 4, 1997, the Oregon voters defeated a legislative referral to repeal the
law. In Washington and California, statutes legalizing physician-assisted suicide failed to pass
by narrow margins. The proposed laws of both California and Washington would have also
permitted active euthanasia. See Eugenie Anne Gifford, Comment, Artes Moriendi: Active
Euthanasia and the Art of Dying, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1545 passim (1993) (discussing Cali-
fornia Proposition 161, § 2525.2 and Washington's initiative, Measure 119). Proposals to per-
mit physician-assisted suicide have come to a vote before the state legislature in at least four
other states: Iowa, Maine, Michigan, and New Hampshire. In February 1998, the Maine legis-
lature defeated an Oregon type statute:
The bill, rejected by the House 99 to 42, aroused passionate arguments on both sides
of the issue, with lawmakers recalling relatives and friends who had suffered painful
deaths and others invoking religious objections against the legislation. The bill was
similar to an Oregon law.... Last Year, South Dakota and Virginia enacted laws
that prevent authorities from holding physicians liable for prescribing or administer-
ing medication to relieve pain even if the dosage hastens death.
Maine Lawmakers Reject Bill Allowing Doctor-Assisted Suicides, N.Y. Tamls, Feb. 12, 1998,
at A25.
15 The Oregon statute was immediately challenged in federal district court and found to
be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court issued an injunction. See Lee v.
Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995). A federal appeals court overturned the decision on
the grounds that the challengers lacked standing because the law had not yet gone into effect.
See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997). The United States denied certiorari. See
Lee v. Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997). Denying certiorari in October of 1997 was not a
judgment on the merits. Refusing to hear the challenge to the state initiative was, however,
consistent with the court's view, expressed in June 1997, that the state legislatures would be
granted deference on this issue.
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federal funds for physician-assisted suicide. 16 It remains to be seen how
that statute will affect the practice of medicine or law in Oregon and
other states that follow the Oregon model.
Who is eligible for physician assisted suicide under the Oregon stat-
ute? What are the consent provisions? The statutory language governing
which patients are eligible for physician-assisted suicide reads as
follows:
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has
been determined by the attending physician and consult-
ing physician to be suffering from a terminal disease,
and who has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die,
may make a written request for medication for the pur-
pose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified
manner in accordance with [this Act]. 17
The statute defines capable as "not incapable." 18 The statute further
indicates:
"Incapable" means that in the opinion of a court or in the
opinion of the patient's attending physician or consulting
physician, a patient lacks the ability to make and com-
municate health care decisions to health care providers,
including communication through persons familiar with
the patient's manner of communicating if those persons
are available. 19
Additionally, the statute describes the form for socially-assisted dy-
ing requests and discusses the qualifications for consulting physicians
and witnesses. The reference to a court deciding whether a patient is
"incapable," however, is the relevant point. Issues of consent and capac-
ity are now central. In theory, a court is to oversee these decisions, and
there will be regulations spelling out how these terms, consent and ca-
pacity, will be operationalized.
The Supreme Court has dealt with similar issues in the capital pun-
ishment context. For example, in Ford v. Wainwright,2 0 the Court ex-
amined the issue of competency to be executed. In Ford, the prisoner
developed symptoms of psychosis after eight years on death row.2 1 It
16 See Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-12, (1997).
Thirty five states, as of August 1997, had laws outlawing physician-assisted suicide and no
state had passed a law similar to the Oregon statute. See Brad Knickerbocker, Oregon Revisits
Assisted-Suicide Debate, CmusTLAN Sci. MoNrroR, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1.
17 OR. REv. STAT. § 127.805.s2.01 (1995).
18 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800.sl.01(6) (1995).
19 Id.
20 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
21 Id. at 402-04.
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was not the prospect of sentencing the prisoner to death, however, that
bothered the Court. Instead, the Court examined the procedures used to
determine a prisoner's competency. 22 Similarly, if provisions in the Ore-
gon Death with Dignity Act come before the Supreme Court, it will
probably be the procedures, and not the substance, that will be at issue.
What constitutes evidence of competence or capacity? Is it speech
or communication? Is it recognition of reality? If a patient is incompe-
tent, presumably she does not know that she is incompetent or that she is
consenting to death. If competency is determined by adherence to regu-
lations, presumptions, bureaucratic decision-making, or committees, then
courts will not reverse the decisions. The legal issues will be how elabo-
rate or comprehensive the regulations are, and whether or not decision-
makers follow the required procedures. 23 Or, the courts may not be in-
volved in the decision at all (for better or for worse).
The hospitals, bureaucratic decision-makers, and doctors may well
prefer to have the decision about death transferred to a hospital board or
another group of decision-makers. Doctors and medical staff will not be
enthusiastic about deferring to courts on such decisions. The delays in-
troduced by appellate review also support leaving decision-making
within the institutions. It remains to be seen what role lawyers will have
in the system. For example, how will lawyers challenge a functioning
bureaucracy, with its own institutional imperatives, that is not required to
make its decisions public?
Even the most elaborate regulations written, however, cannot pro-
tect anyone if they are ignored, unknown, or not understood. Mentally
retarded defendants, for example, have been sentenced to death, had their
convictions upheld, and been executed, without having any mitigating
evidence of their impairment presented to the jury or court by their inept
or inattentive attomeys.24
Many residents of institutions have suffered from strokes or from
diseases such as Alzheimer's which make their mental capacity indeter-
minate in the most profound sense.25 What is the status of a "compe-
tency" which comes and goes, depending on the time of day or other
22 See id. at 416-17.
23 Kathryn Tucker's conference presentation describes a situation in which the Washing-
ton state procedures for the termination of life support, which were on their face adequate,
were totally ignored. See Conference Transcript, supra note 7 (Session IV).
24 See Colloquy, Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in This Corpus?, 27
Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 523, 576-77, 585-86, 593 (1996); see also Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J.
Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next
Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759 (1995).
25 While it is difficult to measure the number of people in nursing home who suffer from
dementia, from a variety of causes, it has been estimated to be in the range of 50 to 60 percent.
See Pearl S. German et al., The Role of Mental Morbidity in the Nursing Home Experience, 32
GERoNroL oIsT 152, 156, 158 (1992).
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random factors? The courts are theoretically available to protect and en-
sure basic constitutional rights for patients and doctors, and for persons
who are not patients. Few cases, however, will actually reach the courts.
Even if these cases do reach the courts, appeals take years and the cir-
cumstances may change before final resolution by the courts.
In most cases, institutional administrators will be deciding who is
capable of consenting to assisted suicide and under what circumstances.
Dead women and men tell no tales, and who is to say, when someone is
dead, that they would not have been dead in six months anyway. At least
in large hospitals with federal and state funding, there will be seminars
on physician-assisted suicide regulations and staff will be urged to care-
fully adhere to the regulations.
One large, unaddressed question is the role of surrogate decision-
makers. The power of attorney for health care, which is routinely as-
signed by thousands of people when they make their wills or in anticipa-
tion of travel, surgery or a serious illness, fully delegates to a surrogate
decision-maker the legal authority over the autonomy of the assignor.
Thus, the person holding the power of attorney for health care decisions
stands in the shoes of the patient. This means the person with the power
of attorney can decide anything the patient could decide if she were able.
Once an individual has the power of attorney for health care deci-
sions, can she authorize physician-assisted suicide in the same manner as
the patient herself? Absent a specific statute precluding surrogate deci-
sion-makers from making such decisions, the presumption is that existing
legal structures remain in place. Therefore, surrogate decision-makers
can make decisions regarding the termination and the refusal of life pro-
longing treatment as long as they follow regulations.
After the conference, the United States Supreme Court addressed
physician-assisted suicide and determined that courts must respect and
defer to state legislatures. Notions of individual self-determination and
autonomy were cornerstones of the Supreme Court's analysis in Quill
and Glucksberg, where it examined lower appellate court rulings that
prohibited state laws banning physician-assisted suicide for competent
persons with terminal illnesses.
In Quill v. Vacco, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
that a competent individual with a terminal illness may have a right to
physician-assisted suicide under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.26 In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that competent terminally ill patients
26 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 725-31 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
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have a due process liberty interest in choosing physician-assisted
suicide. 27
The Supreme Court approached Quill and Glucksberg as companion
cases, finding that there was not a fundamental constitutional right to
physician-assisted suicide in ending life.28 The Court also concluded
that equal protection considerations did not bar states from enacting laws
that prohibit physician-assisted suicide.29
In its decisions, the Supreme Court maintained the distinction be-
tween withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and prescribing life-ending
medication.30 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that states may continue to distinguish between refusing treatment and
recognizing the right to physician assistance in committing suicide:
"[T]he distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sus-
taining treatment [is] a distinction widely recognized and endorsed in the
medical profession and in our legal traditions . . . it is certainly ra-
tional... [and it] comports with fundamental legal principles of causa-
tion and intent."'31 Rehnquist also noted, "When a patient refuses life-
sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease or
pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a phy-
sician, he is killed by that medication." '32
The Court held that there was no equal protection violation in the
state statute at issue that allowed a doctor to provide palliative care, but
that did not allow a doctor to prescribe life-ending medication. 33 This
was found even though palliative care sometimes has the "double effect"
of causing death. 34 Although the Supreme Court rejected arguments es-
tablishing a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, the Justices
did not attempt, nor explicitly intend, to resolve the issue. Chief Justice
Rehnquist emphasized that the holdings permit continuing dialogue be-
tween citizens "engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the mo-
rality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. '35
Additionally, five of the concurring Justices indicated that the decisions
did not foreclose further debate about the limits the Constitution places
27 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
28 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271 (1997).
29 See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2296 (1997).
30 See id. at 2298, 2298 n.6.
31 l at 2298 (citations omitted).
32 Id.
33 See id. at 2302.
34 See id. at 2298-2301; Timothy E. Quill et al., The Rule of Double Effect-A Critique
of Its Role in End-of-Life Decision Making, 337 NEw ENG. J. MaD. 1768, 1768 (1997).
35 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275.
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upon the power of the states to regulate, criminalize or prohibit physi-
cian-assisted suicide.36
These five concurring Justices, including Justices O'Connor and
Stevens, intimated that there may be a right to assistance for suicide in
future cases. Writing separately, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that
states are "presently undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of
physician-assisted suicide and other related issues. ' 37 Justice Stevens
noted that the results in Quill and Glucksberg did not mean that future
statutory applications would necessarily be invalid.38 Stevens explained
that he would not "foreclose the possibility that an individual plaintiff
seeking to hasten her death, or a doctor whose assistance was sought,
could prevail in a more particularized challenge. '39 Future cases will
determine exactly what such a challenge may require. These cases will
occur, however, in the states, where legislators will be "free to decide
whether to allow doctors to help patients die."40
Speculating about the ramifications of Quill and Glucksberg for
stakeholders and state decision-makers, Kathryn Tucker, Director of
Legal Affairs for Compassion in Dying, counsel in both Supreme Court
cases, and a speaker at the conference, reflected that "[t]he decisions,
while providing no immediate relief to suffering dying patients, signal
the possibility for future recognition of a federal constitutional right for
competent, dying patients to choose a humane and peaceful death with
physician assistance."'41 Tucker views the question answered by the ma-
jority as "whether there is a general right to suicide and assistance
therein, a question on which the parties had no dispute. '42
While the door may be "half open" for future rulings in physician-
assisted suicide cases, it may also be half closed. The Court examined
the limits of legitimate state interests in banning assisted suicide. It cast
suicide as a public health problem exacerbated by untreated depression.
Relying on empirical studies, the Court noted that many patients who
contemplated physician-assisted suicide withdrew their requests when
treated for depression. 43 A recent study of attitudes toward physician-
assisted suicide gathered from oncologists, oncology patients, and the
36 See id. at 2290 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at
2304 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2310 (Ginsburg, J., concurring for substantially the same
reasons as Justice O'Connor); id. at 2310-11 (Breyer, J., concurring).
37 Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38 See id. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 2309.
40 Judy Peres, Assisted-Suicide Bans Upheld: Justices Say There's No Constitutional
Right to Aided Death, but Leave Door Open for States, CEH. TRi., June 27, 1997, at 1.
41 Telephone Interview by Peter Blanck with Kathryn Tucker, Counsel, Compassion in
Dying (July 1997).
42 Id.
43 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2273.
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public found that "patients who had seriously considered and prepared
for euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide were significantly more
likely to be depressed." 44
In its decision, the Court explained that states continue to have a
legitimate interest in protecting vulnerable groups, including people with
disabilities.45 The Court recognized the risk of social, economic, and
medical coercion for certain individuals and their families who are mak-
ing end-of-life decisions.46 Yet, the cautionary opinions also suggested a
shared unwillingness to allow legislators the opportunity to proceed
down the "slippery slope" from legalization of physician-assisted suicide
toward the legalization of passive and active euthanasia. As echoed by
members of the disability community at our conference, this "slippery
slope," according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, would "likely, in effect,
[be] a much broader license, which could prove extremely difficult to
police and contain." 47
Recent attitudinal surveys in Oregon, Michigan, and Washington re-
flect mixed views by physicians on physician-assisted suicide. A major-
ity of physicians polled (40-60%) are in favor of legalization in some
form.48 Almost one-third (29%) of the respondents in Oregon, however,
thought that legalization of physician-assisted suicide could result in le-
thal overdoses given to patients without their request.49 An overwhelm-
ing proportion (93%) believed that patients would be motivated to
request physician-assisted suicide because of concern about being a bur-
den to others or because of financial pressures (83%).50 Half were not
confident that they could predict when patients were truly terminally ill,
defined as having less than 6 months to live.5 1 About one-third of its
physicians were not confident they could recognize depression in pa-
tients requesting physician-assisted suicide.5 2 Half were not sure what
medications they would prescribe in any event. 53
44 Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Attitudes and
Experiences of Oncology Patients, Oncologists, and the Public, 347 LANc-r 1805, 1809
(1996).
45 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2273.
46 See id. at 2273.
47 Id. at 2274.
48 See Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public toward
Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 303,
303 (1996); Anthony L. Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington
State, 275 JAMA 919, 924 (1996); Melinda A. Lee et al., Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of
Physicians in Oregon, 334 Naw ENG. J. MED. 310, 310 (1996).
49 See Lee, supra note 48, at 311.
50 See id.
51 See id. at 312.
52 See id. at 312-13.
53 See id. at 313.
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Like medical practitioners, participants at the conference were un-
certain about the definition of physician-assisted suicide. At the confer-
ence, we distributed surveys with nine clinical scenarios representing
examples of palliative care, withdrawing and withholding life sustaining
treatment, physician-assisted suicide, and active voluntary and involun-
tary euthanasia. Forty percent of the 200 respondents identified them-
selves as health care professionals, with the remaining 60 percent
including lawyers, religious leaders, disability advocates allied health
professional and others. About 80% of the respondents incorrectly iden-
tified active euthanasia as an example of physician-assisted suicide.
Only 53% correctly identified a scenario describing physician-assisted
suicide. Moreover, some respondents were incorrect in identifying the
currently legal practice of withdrawing dialysis at the request of a com-
petent patient as physician-assisted suicide.54
A similar blurring of boundaries occurred in the Second Circuit's
decision in Quill. The Second Circuit equated withdrawing a ventilator
from a terminally ill patient with writing a prescription for a lethal dose
of medication.5 5 Yet the predominant legal, ethical, and medical position
for over twenty years has been that withdrawing and withholding life-
sustaining treatment at the request of a competent patient is not suicide.
Rather, this is a legal practice allowing the course of the disease to pro-
ceed without unwanted medical intervention.
At the conference, many physicians sensitive to disability issues
emphasized that it was wrong to assume that health care providers are
equipped to deal with disability issues or to recognize their inability to do
so in certain circumstances. Newly disabled patients or disabled patients
who are depressed are vulnerable because their ability to advocate for
themselves, seek out resources, and educate their health care providers
may be compromised.
Many medical community members are beginning to address the
"slippery slope" concerns that the physician-assisted suicide debate
raises for persons with disabilities by devising therapeutic and adminis-
trative safeguards. No matter how carefully constructed, however, "safe-
guards" and "safety nets" will not protect patients devalued by a system
and a society that views health care as a privilege, disability as a tragedy,
and leaves the allocation of health care resources to the demands of the
market.
54 More specific information regarding the survey's participants and their answers will
be released this year. See Kristi Kirschner et al. (manuscript in progress) (on file with
authors).
55 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
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The debate over physician-assisted suicide will continue in state
legislatures, state regulatory agencies, and state funding agencies.56
Those involved in the debate will include doctors and administrators at
state and private institutions and hospitals, members of the disability
community and their families, lawyers, ethicists, and many others. Hos-
pitals will need to reassess their internal review policies in light of the
Supreme Court's unwillingness to invalidate existing criminal statutes.
Lawyers will need to reevaluate their duties to clients, both individual
and institutional. Ultimately, the physician-assisted suicide debate needs
to be guided by an understanding of the lives of persons throughout soci-
ety who face end-of-life decisions.
After Quill and Glucksberg, as before, state legislatures have the
authority to criminalize assisting suicide by doctors and others, enact
statutes regulating physician-assisted suicide, or abstain from the issue
and apply existing criminal statutes to assisted suicide situations. View-
ing assisted suicide as a public health issue provokes examination of the
preventive measures that have been taken to lower risk factors and im-
prove life potentials for groups at risk, particularly for all members of the
disability community.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) will increas-
ingly factor into the socially-assisted dying debate. The ADA is a com-
prehensive civil rights law that addresses discrimination against millions
of Americans in the areas of employment, state and local governmental
services, public accommodations, and health insurance.57 Persons with
disabilities involved in the physician-assisted suicide dialogue at the con-
ference invoked the ADA on both sides of the debate.
Proponents in favor of legalization have emphasized that self-deter-
mination is central to the goals of the ADA. Therefore, physician-as-
sisted suicide should be legalized to avoid the overprotective rules and
policies that Congress targeted in enacting the ADA. Opponents of le-
galizing physician-assisted suicide argue that inadequate health care and
health insurance coverage, and the lack of economic power of many peo-
ple with disabilities will extend to the lack of a voice in life-ending deci-
sion-making.5 8 Thus, if terminally ill patients are not receiving adequate
56 The discussion will also continue in academic journals. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Pope
and John Lecture, 88 J. Ciu. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 1998).
57 See generally Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior, and
the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 ViL. L. REv. 345
(1997); Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Genetic Discrimination and the Em-
ployment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Emerging Legal, Empirical, and
Policy Implications, 14 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 411 (1996); Peter David Blanck, Employment Inte-
gration, Economic Opportunity, and The Americans with Disabilities Act: Empirical Study
from 1990-1993, 79 IowA L. REv. 853 (1994).
58 Participants in the conference commented that disabled persons received different care
and medical advice, based upon the view of their condition by medical professionals. See
1998]
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palliative or mental health care, opponents argue that they are not receiv-
ing equal access to health care as mandated by the ADA.
Participants in the Socially-Assisted Dying Conference agreed that
reliable data are lacking on a broad range of factors in this debate. A
strong and comprehensive factual basis is needed to support a reasonable
policy position on either side. The next generation of decisions to be
made may not be less but more complex than those that faced the plain-
tiffs in Quill and Glucksberg.
Conference Transcript, supra note 7 (remarks of Carol Gill, Marca Bristo and Audience Par-
ticipants in Session V).
